The troubles of Jensen Huang have just begun

Author: Black Mario

NVIDIA was originally scheduled to hold the AI Day Seoul 2026 event on November 9, and Huang Minshan, the eldest daughter of NVIDIA's Senior Director and Founder Jensen Huang, was planned to attend this event.

According to previous arrangements, Huang Minshan would participate in the event in Seoul and meet with South Korean government officials to discuss cooperation in the field of artificial intelligence.

South Korea itself is an important semiconductor cooperation market for NVIDIA, with companies like Samsung and SK Hynix maintaining close business relationships with NVIDIA. Huang Minshan has also participated in various activities related to the AI industry in South Korea, making this event quite significant for her.

However, the day before her departure, her entire schedule was suddenly canceled. At that time, Yonhap News Agency cited sources stating that the cancellation might be related to family issues, but did not disclose specific reasons.

Looking at it now, the reasons for Huang Minshan's cancellation involve both public and private matters.

The private matter is that her 63-year-old father has been unfaithful, with the affair involving a Chinese woman named Huang Le, who was previously an executive at the Singapore data center company Megaspeed.

On November 8, Jensen Huang personally sent an apology letter to all NVIDIA employees. The tech giant founder, who has led NVIDIA for over thirty years, publicly admitted his infidelity in the letter.

He stated that his actions hurt his wife and children, and there is no excuse for this, apologizing to his family, employees, the board, and shareholders.

In fact, Jensen Huang met his wife Lori during college, and they have lived together for decades, having one son and one daughter. Both children later joined NVIDIA. Now, this tech entrepreneur, once seen as successful in both career and family, must publicly face his marital crisis.

As for the public matter, it is likely related to the troubles NVIDIA is facing.

On November 7, the Financial Times cited insiders revealing that a previously obtained internal memo by U.S. intelligence agencies indicated that the woman Huang Le, who was in a relationship with Jensen Huang, is suspected by U.S. intelligence of being recruited by Chinese intelligence agencies to approach Jensen Huang and obtain information related to NVIDIA and advanced AI chips in the U.S.

Meanwhile, NVIDIA's board is also in a difficult position. They have established a committee composed of independent directors and hired external lawyers to investigate whether Jensen Huang has become a target of foreign intelligence operations.

As a Senior Director, Huang Minshan naturally needs to return to help deal with this mess.

Thus, the issue of Jensen Huang's infidelity has far exceeded the scope of personal family life.

The complexities behind this matter involve intricate power dynamics, and Jensen Huang's troubles may just be beginning.

What kind of company is Megaspeed?

Why did U.S. intelligence agencies focus on Huang Le? This actually starts with the company Megaspeed.

Initially, Megaspeed had no connection to artificial intelligence.

In 2015, a company named 7Road International was registered in Singapore, backed by the Chinese gaming company 7Road. 7Road was once a significant player in China's web game industry, developing games like "Dancing on the Clouds" and "God Song," and later received support from state-owned investment institutions.

In 2023, with the global AI boom sparked by ChatGPT, this Singapore company shifted its business direction.

In March of that year, 7Road International officially changed its name to Megaspeed International and began entering the AI computing and cloud computing industry. The aforementioned Huang Le also took on the role of Managing Director during this period.

Subsequently, the company's equity was transferred to the Singaporean company Swiftdata, and Huang Le exited the board. In early 2024, Megaspeed established a subsidiary, Speedmatrix, in Malaysia to handle local equipment procurement and related business.

This company, which previously had little recognition in the global tech industry, then engaged in remarkably large-scale business.

In June 2024, Speedmatrix began large-scale procurement of AI servers equipped with NVIDIA GPUs.

According to an investigation by The New York Times into ImportGenius trade records, from June 2024 to February 2026, Megaspeed's Malaysian affiliate procured at least $4.8 billion worth of advanced AI equipment, including a significant amount of NVIDIA chips and related technologies.

For a company that had just recently transitioned to the AI business, this procurement scale is quite astonishing.

Its procurement channels also caught the attention of U.S. regulatory authorities.

A significant portion of the equipment procured by Megaspeed came from the U.S. server supplier Aivres, which has close ties with the Chinese server manufacturer Inspur Group.

Some entities under Inspur Group were placed on the U.S. export control entity list in 2023 due to their support for the development of China's military supercomputing technology.

However, Aivres, as a company operating in the U.S. and not listed on the same restriction list, was still able to purchase NVIDIA chips while complying with relevant export regulations.

Thus, a cross-border supply chain was formed.

NVIDIA provides GPUs, Aivres and other server suppliers handle equipment integration, and then export the related products to Speedmatrix in Malaysia.

These servers are subsequently used for data center operations in Southeast Asia.

Megaspeed's business model primarily involves renting out GPU computing power to other companies. It is responsible for purchasing chips and servers, deploying the equipment in data centers, and providing remote computing services to clients.

Clients do not need to purchase chips; they only need to access computing resources via the internet.

Megaspeed has provided computing services to Chinese companies, including Alibaba, from its data centers in Malaysia and Indonesia.

This raises a question regarding U.S. chip export controls.

Since 2022, the U.S. has restricted the export of certain advanced AI chips to China, but these restrictions do not mean that all Chinese companies cannot use computing resources located overseas.

If Chinese companies rent GPUs through Malaysian data centers, and the chips remain in Malaysia, whether the related transactions violate U.S. regulations needs to be assessed based on export licenses, end-users, and actual transaction arrangements.

However, if a company were to transport controlled chips that should have been deployed in Malaysia back to China without permission, it could directly violate U.S. export control regulations.

U.S. investigators suspect that some of Megaspeed's operations may involve the latter situation.

In fact, the U.S. government's scrutiny of Megaspeed began even before the exposure of Jensen Huang's personal relationship scandal.

In 2024, officials from the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security visited Malaysia to inspect a data center used by Megaspeed. Investigators found that some of the procured NVIDIA equipment was still in its packaging and had not been put into operation, raising suspicions.

By October 2025, The New York Times published an investigative report on Megaspeed.

In the same month, Republican Senator Tom Cotton formally wrote to U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, requesting an investigation into whether Megaspeed was using complex corporate relationships and cross-border transactions to help Chinese clients circumvent U.S. advanced chip export restrictions.

Cotton specifically mentioned the company's connections with suppliers related to Inspur Group and the difficulties in confirming the ultimate use of the chips.

As the investigation deepened this year, the U.S. Department of Commerce's inquiry into Megaspeed has been handed over to the Department of Justice, bringing the related issues under the purview of U.S. judicial investigations.

In response to U.S. concerns, NVIDIA has consistently maintained its position.

On October 29, Jensen Huang stated in an interview with Bloomberg that NVIDIA's business dealings with Megaspeed are entirely normal. He emphasized that the company has checked Megaspeed's GPU deployment situation and verified the related equipment, finding no evidence of chips being illegally transported to China.

Thus, based on the currently available information, U.S. investigators are primarily focused on two issues:

First, whether the advanced AI equipment procured by Megaspeed has been illegally transported to China.

Second, whether the computing power services provided by these devices involve helping restricted entities evade U.S. export regulations.

The related investigation has yet to reach a final conclusion, but Megaspeed's experience already reflects the real challenges faced by U.S. chip controls.

Even if chips are restricted from being exported to a certain country, local companies may still obtain computing power through data centers in other countries.

The U.S. places such importance on these chips due to the chip blockade against China that began a few years ago.

U.S. Chip Blockade Against China

On October 7, 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced a new export control measure.

According to the regulations, advanced computing chips like NVIDIA's A100 and H100 require prior approval from the U.S. government for export to China. Some semiconductor manufacturing equipment and technologies related to supercomputing were also included in the restrictions.

Previously, the U.S. had limited Chinese tech companies like Huawei from obtaining certain advanced technologies through entity lists and other means. However, this time, the restrictions expanded to advanced computing chips and related supply chains, directly impacting China's access to high-performance computing power for its AI industry.

The U.S. Department of Commerce cited national security as the reason.

The U.S. government believes that advanced computing capabilities can be used not only to train AI models but also for military simulations, intelligence analysis, weapon development, and supercomputing. If China can continue to obtain the most advanced chips from the U.S., it may narrow the gap between the two countries in related technology fields.

Therefore, the U.S. aims to slow down China's development in these areas by restricting the supply of advanced chips and semiconductor manufacturing technologies.

However, this policy soon encountered NVIDIA.

At that time, NVIDIA had already occupied a significant position in the global AI computing market, with China being one of its important markets.

To maintain its business in China, NVIDIA began adjusting its product designs, launching chips like the A800 and H800 that complied with the then-current export regulations.

These products had certain performance limitations, allowing them to meet U.S. export requirements while continuing to sell to Chinese customers.

However, the U.S. government quickly discovered that Chinese companies could still use these products to build large AI computing clusters.

On October 17, 2023, the Biden administration further tightened controls, adjusting the performance thresholds and applicable scope for advanced chips, which also affected the new restrictions on NVIDIA's A800 and H800 specifically designed for the Chinese market.

NVIDIA subsequently launched products like the H20, continuing to attempt to retain its Chinese market.

This led to a prolonged situation where the U.S. government continuously adjusted export regulations, while NVIDIA modified its product designs according to the new rules to keep its business in China operational.

By 2025, Trump was back in power, and Nvidia initially hoped that the U.S. government would relax some restrictions, but things did not go smoothly.

On April 9, the U.S. government notified Nvidia that exporting the H20 chip to China also required a license, which directly affected Nvidia's already arranged production plans and customer orders.

According to documents submitted by Nvidia to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the company confirmed approximately $4.5 billion in expenses for the first fiscal quarter of that year due to H20 inventory backlog and procurement commitments.

A month later, at the Taipei International Computer Show, Jensen Huang publicly expressed dissatisfaction with U.S. export policies.

He believed that the ongoing restrictions on U.S. companies selling AI chips to China were forcing Chinese customers to turn to domestic suppliers like Huawei.

At that time, Jensen Huang revealed that Nvidia's market share in the Chinese AI chip market had dropped from about 95% to 50%.

He also predicted that the Chinese AI market size could reach $50 billion by 2026. In his view, if U.S. companies exited this market for the long term, they would lose not only chip sales revenue but also the future reliance of the Chinese AI industry on the U.S. technology system.

This also involved Nvidia's own business model.

One of Nvidia's most important competitive advantages is its long-established software ecosystem, CUDA.

Developers use Nvidia GPUs to train and deploy AI models, often requiring accompanying software, development tools, and technical support.

As more and more companies use Nvidia products, the related software and computing infrastructure will continue to develop around it, helping Nvidia maintain a long-term competitive advantage.

China has a large number of internet companies, AI developers, and researchers.

If these users are unable to purchase Nvidia chips for an extended period, they will have a stronger motivation to seek alternatives.

Once domestic AI companies gradually adapt to local computing platforms like Huawei, even if the U.S. reopens some chip exports in the future, Nvidia may not easily regain its original market.

Therefore, Jensen Huang also began to actively seek to persuade the U.S. government to relax restrictions.

In July 2025, things finally took a turn for the better.

After communicating with the Trump administration, Nvidia announced that the U.S. government had assured the company that it would approve H20 export license applications that met the requirements.

In August, the U.S. Department of Commerce began issuing relevant licenses, allowing Nvidia to once again sell H20 to some Chinese customers.

By December 8, 2025, Trump announced that the U.S. would allow Nvidia to sell the more powerful H200 chip to approved Chinese customers, while proposing that the U.S. government receive revenue equivalent to 25% of the sales from related transactions.

On January 13, 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce officially adjusted its license review policy, changing the principle of rejecting licenses for products like the H200 to case-by-case reviews.

Applying companies still need to meet conditions such as customer screening, product safety testing, and domestic supply assurance in the U.S.

However, the policy relaxation did not immediately allow Nvidia to resume its business in China.

On one hand, the U.S. still restricts the export of the most advanced chips. On the other hand, China is also promoting the development of its domestic AI computing industry, implementing reviews and restrictions on the procurement of certain U.S. chips.

Nvidia's financial report released in August 2026 showed that as of the quarter ending July 26 of that year, the company's total revenue reached $96.2 billion, but revenue from the Chinese data center Hopper products accounted for less than 1% of its data center business revenue.

The company's performance forecast for the next quarter did not include revenue from Chinese data center computing.

On October 13, 2026, Reuters cited data from market research firm IDC, reporting that in the first half of 2026, Nvidia's market share in the Chinese data center AI chip market had dropped to 34%, while Huawei's share had risen to 28%.

The gap between the two was only 6 percentage points.

Nvidia's AI accelerator chip shipments in the Chinese market in the first half of the year were about 678,000 units, a year-on-year decline of 44%, while Huawei's shipments reached about 572,000 units, showing significant growth compared to the previous year.

These numbers can explain why Jensen Huang places such importance on the Chinese market.

Years of export restrictions are changing the procurement choices and technology routes of the Chinese AI industry.

For the U.S. government, restricting the export of advanced chips can reduce China's direct access to U.S. leading computing technology.

For Nvidia, however, this policy may help competitors gain more customers and accelerate the development of China's domestic computing ecosystem.

Thus, there are clear differences in goals between the two sides.

Jensen Huang is also very clear that the key to whether Nvidia can continue to sell chips to China is no longer within the company.

Chip performance can be adjusted, products can be redesigned, but export licenses are in the hands of the U.S. government.

To change the policy, it is necessary to influence decision-making in Washington.

As a result, Jensen Huang began to frequently engage with Trump and U.S. government officials, actively seeking to relax restrictions on AI chip exports to China.

His relationship with Trump gradually developed against this backdrop.

Jensen Huang and Trump

On January 31, 2025, just over ten days after returning to the White House, Trump hosted Jensen Huang.

Just a few days earlier, the AI model released by the Chinese AI company DeepSeek had shaken the U.S. tech community.

DeepSeek claimed it could achieve performance close to that of leading U.S. models at a relatively low cost, leading the market to question whether the business model of U.S. tech giants investing hundreds of billions of dollars in AI computing power truly had long-term advantages.

On January 27, Nvidia's stock price plummeted nearly 17% in a single day, with a market value evaporating by about $593 billion, setting the record for the largest single-day market value loss for a U.S. publicly traded company at that time.

In Washington, the emergence of DeepSeek also prompted the U.S. government to reevaluate its export policy on AI chips to China.

The first meeting between Trump and Jensen Huang at the White House took place against this backdrop.

During this meeting, they discussed DeepSeek, the development of the U.S. AI industry, and further restrictions on advanced chip exports to China.

After the meeting, Trump told reporters that their exchange was pleasant and referred to Jensen Huang as a gentleman. Nvidia stated that the two sides discussed how to strengthen U.S. leadership in the semiconductor and AI fields.

In the following months, Jensen Huang gradually became one of the entrepreneurs frequently contacted by the Trump administration in the AI industry.

In April 2025, Nvidia announced plans to expand its production layout in the U.S. in collaboration with partners like TSMC, Foxconn, and Wistron, planning to produce AI infrastructure products worth up to $500 billion through the U.S. domestic supply chain over the next four years.

This plan involved chip manufacturing in Arizona and AI supercomputer production in Texas.

This news delighted Trump.

On April 14, the White House issued a statement calling Nvidia's plan to expand U.S. manufacturing a result of Trump's industrial policy.

This also reflected the gradually forming intersection of interests between the two.

Trump's political stance is to bring advanced manufacturing back to the U.S., hoping that U.S. tech companies will expand domestic investment while using the development of the AI industry to create jobs and economic growth.

Jensen Huang, on the other hand, needs to gain support from the White House to minimize the impact of export controls on Nvidia's global business.

Both sides have something the other needs.

In May 2025, Trump visited Saudi Arabia, and Jensen Huang appeared in the accompanying U.S. business delegation.

At the U.S.-Saudi Investment Forum held in Riyadh, Trump publicly mentioned Jensen Huang, calling him his friend, and introduced Nvidia's position in the global AI chip market to the audience.

At that time, the U.S. was promoting AI infrastructure cooperation with Gulf countries, and Nvidia was an important technology supplier in this regard.

However, despite their increasingly close relationship, the Trump administration did not immediately relax restrictions on chip exports to China.

As mentioned earlier, Nvidia's H20 faced restrictions in April, and it wasn't until July that a breakthrough occurred.

On July 10, Jensen Huang met with Trump at the White House again. According to the original plan, he would visit China afterward.

Four days later, Nvidia announced that the U.S. government had guaranteed that it would approve H20 chip export license applications that met the requirements.

Jensen Huang then traveled to Beijing to communicate with representatives from the Chinese government and technology industry.

This time, he brought back the policy signals Nvidia hoped to receive from Washington.

But Trump clearly had his own business calculations.

In August 2025, Reuters disclosed that Nvidia and AMD agreed to pay the U.S. government a portion of their sales revenue from chip sales to China, at a rate of 15%, as part of the arrangement to obtain related export licenses.

This move sparked considerable controversy in the U.S.

In the past, U.S. export restrictions on sensitive technologies primarily revolved around national security and technology risks, rarely requiring companies to pay a certain percentage of sales revenue to the government as a licensing condition.

But Trump was willing to consider such arrangements.

In his policy logic, as long as the relevant technology risks could be controlled, the U.S. government could still gain economic benefits by allowing certain commercial transactions.

The H200 export arrangement later proposed by Trump also reflected this line of thinking.

For Trump, allowing China to purchase some U.S. AI chips had another layer of consideration.

If Chinese AI companies continued to use Nvidia GPUs, they might continue to rely on U.S. software ecosystems, technical standards, and supply chains.

U.S. companies could earn revenue from this, and the U.S. could maintain significant influence over the global AI industry.

Compared to completely cutting off technology supplies, this is a different competitive path.

Of course, this policy also has its controversies, as chip sales could similarly help Chinese companies enhance their computing capabilities.

But at least from Trump's perspective, there is not completely no room for negotiation regarding the export control of advanced technologies.

Jensen Huang clearly agreed with this business logic.

Their cooperation in the AI industry also brought Jensen Huang closer to the White House.

On October 8, 2026, Trump personally awarded Jensen Huang the National Medal of Science at a science and technology awards event in Washington, one of the highest honors awarded in the U.S. for outstanding contributions in the fields of science and engineering.

The White House's award statement recognized Jensen Huang's contribution to the development of GPUs from graphics processing devices to general computing architectures, laying an important foundation for artificial intelligence and scientific computing.

Also awarded that day were Elon Musk, Google co-founder Sergey Brin, and AMD CEO Lisa Su.

But just a month later, Jensen Huang became embroiled in a political storm involving Chinese intelligence agencies due to personal relationships.

On November 8, reporters asked Trump about this matter.

Trump stated that he had not yet discussed the relevant accusations with Jensen Huang but still regarded him as a respected person.

He also specifically praised Jensen Huang for his contributions to the United States.

When reporters further asked if he would be willing to bring Jensen Huang along for the upcoming visit to Asia, Trump replied that while specific arrangements were still uncertain, he would certainly be willing to take him.

From Trump's attitude, it is clear that he currently has no intention of cutting ties with Jensen Huang.

This is actually not difficult to understand.

Trump needs NVIDIA to continue expanding domestic manufacturing in the United States, support the construction of AI infrastructure in the U.S., and help maintain America's technological advantage, while Jensen Huang also needs support from the White House on chip exports, international cooperation, and industrial policy.

The two sides have formed quite clear common interests through their interactions over the past nearly two years.

However, Trump's support certainly has its limits; if subsequent investigations reveal serious national security issues involving Jensen Huang, Trump will still have to face pressure from U.S. regulatory agencies and the political system.

Moreover, in the United States, the decision on whether advanced chips can be exported to China is not solely up to the White House.

Although Jensen Huang has received Trump's support, there is another group in Washington that consistently opposes his claims.

Many of these individuals come from the Republican Party, to which Trump belongs.

Another Force in Washington

In July 2025, Jensen Huang had just secured the Trump administration's reopening of some H20 chip exports to China when a Republican congressman publicly expressed opposition just days later.

This person is John Moolenaar, from Michigan, who serves as the chairman of the House Special Committee on China.

Moolenaar believes that the U.S. Department of Commerce's previous decision to restrict H20 exports was entirely correct, and allowing these chips to enter China now would only weaken the United States' technological advantage in artificial intelligence.

He specifically wrote to U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, requesting the government to reconsider this decision.

The policy support that Jensen Huang had just secured from the White House was thus met with opposition from members of Trump's own party.

Moolenaar is a representative figure in Congress advocating for stronger technology restrictions on China.

In his policy stance, the development of China's artificial intelligence industry has become an important issue for U.S. national security. Advanced GPUs can be used for commercial model training and can also be applied in military computing, intelligence analysis, and cyberattacks.

Therefore, he has long advocated for strict limitations on China's access to advanced U.S. computing technology.

In fact, as early as early 2025, when DeepSeek sparked controversy, Moolenaar, along with Democratic chief member Raja Krishnamoorthi of the Special Committee on China, jointly requested the government to tighten export controls related to the chips used by DeepSeek.

This also indicates that there is a certain bipartisan consensus on the hardline stance of Congress regarding technology policy towards China.

By December 2025, when Trump announced the allowance of some H200 chip exports to China, Moolenaar stood up again.

On December 12, he wrote to the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, demanding an explanation of the basis for the government's approval of H200 exports.

In Moolenaar's view, the previous export controls had forced Chinese companies to accelerate their search for alternative technologies, and this process precisely demonstrated that the restrictions were working.

If the U.S. reopens exports of higher-performance chips, it could help China narrow the gap in computing power with the United States.

This time, the Republican congressmen opposing Trump's policy were not limited to Moolenaar alone.

On January 21, 2026, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a meeting to review a bill called the "AI OVERWATCH Act."

The bill was proposed by committee chairman Brian Mast, who is also a Republican.

This bill aims to strengthen Congress's oversight of advanced AI chip exports, requiring that the export of certain sensitive chips must obtain permission, while granting Congress the power to review and even block related permits.

According to Mast's perspective, advanced AI chips already have obvious military applications and cannot be managed solely as ordinary commercial goods.

He even suggested that the relevant exports should draw on the oversight mechanisms of U.S. foreign military sales.

This is essentially a struggle for an important power:

Should the decision on whether advanced AI chips can be exported to China be made by the White House and the Department of Commerce, or should Congress have more intervention rights?

For Trump, export permits can serve as a policy tool in U.S.-China economic and trade negotiations.

But for Mast and other congressmen, if the president has too much discretion, he might approve transactions that they believe pose national security risks for economic benefits.

This disagreement quickly became public.

Trump's White House AI and cryptocurrency special advisor David Sachs openly opposed Mast's bill, arguing that it could limit the president's flexibility in using export control policies.

Mast responded that Sachs could suggest to Trump to sell H200, but his own suggestion was quite the opposite.

Ultimately, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved the advancement of this bill to subsequent legislative procedures with a vote of 42 in favor, 2 against, and 1 abstaining.

At that time, the bill had not yet officially become law, but such a lopsided vote result already indicated broad support for strengthening oversight of AI chip exports within the committee.

Democrats also supported strengthening regulation.

In September 2026, during a visit by a Chinese delegation to the United States, Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer publicly criticized Trump for relaxing restrictions on advanced chip exports to China.

Democratic Senator Elizabeth Warren directly pointed her finger at Jensen Huang (the one who is very tough on Crypto).

She argued that tech entrepreneurs like Jensen Huang should not be allowed to participate in determining U.S. AI export policy for their own commercial interests.

In her view, national security policy should be formulated through government and legislative processes and should not be overly influenced by lobbying from large tech companies.

Thus, the political disagreements surrounding Jensen Huang in Washington have become quite clear.

The White House hopes to retain some policy space between national security and commercial interests.

The hardliners in Congress hope to tighten restrictions further and strengthen oversight of the executive branch.

Moreover, these hardliners exist within both the Republican and Democratic parties.

While both sides may argue endlessly over issues like taxes, immigration, and fiscal spending, there is considerable consensus on restricting China's access to advanced AI technology.

In this political environment, even if Jensen Huang can gain Trump's support, it is difficult to eliminate the pressure from Congress solely based on the president's personal attitude.

By November 2026, the situation changed again.

On November 3, the U.S. midterm elections concluded, with the Democrats gaining a majority in both the House and Senate, set to control the new Congress starting January 2027.

Trump is about to face a Congress controlled by the opposition party, and the Democrats will gain greater committee investigation and oversight powers.

Just the day after the election, on November 4, Jensen Huang received a letter from the U.S. Congress.

It was signed by three individuals:

House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Brian Mast, House Special Committee on China Chairman John Moolenaar, and House Intelligence Committee Chairman Rick Crawford.

All three are from the Republican Party.

They requested Jensen Huang to attend a joint closed-door briefing from the three committees on November 18 and to confirm by November 11 whether he could attend.

The letter specifically requested Jensen Huang to explain the nature of his contacts with Megaspeed executive Huang Le, as well as what security measures NVIDIA has established against foreign intelligence activities.

The three congressmen believe that recent media reports have raised national security concerns about sensitive technologies and information potentially being acquired by China, and Congress needs to understand the actual risks.

It is noteworthy that when this letter was sent, Jensen Huang had not publicly acknowledged infidelity, and NVIDIA's board had not announced the establishment of an independent investigation committee.

Congress's actions had already preceded Jensen Huang's later public apology.

In fact, what the congressmen were concerned about was not only the nature of the relationship between Jensen Huang and Huang Le but also whether this relationship could affect NVIDIA's information security and business decisions.

They wanted to know what measures a CEO responsible for the world's most important AI chip company had taken to prevent sensitive information from being acquired by foreign intelligence agencies during long-term contacts with overseas clients.

NVIDIA also emphasized that the company's dealings with relevant clients are normal business activities, and clients cannot obtain sensitive technology information as a result.

However, the investigation by the U.S. Congress does not necessarily need to wait for an actual leak to be initiated.

When congressmen believe that a certain business relationship may pose security risks, they can use the committee's oversight powers to require companies to submit explanations, undergo inquiries, and even push for further regulatory measures.

For Jensen Huang, this has already marked a significant difference from the previous process of seeking chip export permits.

Earlier, he primarily explained to the U.S. government as an entrepreneur why allowing NVIDIA to continue selling chips to China could benefit America's technological competitiveness.

Now, he needs to explain to congressional members whether he and NVIDIA have properly managed potential national security risks.

What is even more troubling is that after the new Congress is sworn in in 2027, the Democrats will have more investigative resources.

Thus, a rather special situation has emerged.

Trump still publicly affirms Jensen Huang, while hardliners within the Republican Party have demanded that he undergo an investigation, and the Democrats are about to take over Congress, having long opposed certain advanced chip export policies to China.

For Jensen Huang, the relationships built with the White House over the past few years are no longer sufficient to cope with all political pressures.

And this investigation against him happens to occur during a special period when the power in the U.S. Congress is about to change hands, and the debate over U.S.-China chip policies continues to heat up.

As for why the relevant intelligence has been concentrated and exposed at this time, whether there are more complex political factors behind it is worth further investigation.

Why Now, Targeting Jensen Huang?

In fact, U.S. intelligence agencies began paying attention to Huang Le as early as 2025, and Trump himself was informed of the relevant situation. In the spring of 2026, U.S. officials compiled an internal memorandum regarding the private relationship between Jensen Huang and Huang Le.

However, these matters were never made public, and Jensen Huang was not significantly affected by them; he even received the National Medal of Science from Trump himself in October of this year.

It wasn't until October 29 that The New York Times suddenly exposed the relevant intelligence, followed by media such as the Financial Times, and then Congress intervened, Jensen Huang publicly apologized, and NVIDIA's board initiated an independent investigation.

In just ten days, such a significant change occurred.

I personally tend to believe that the concentrated outbreak of this incident is likely related to the political struggle within the United States surrounding AI chip export policies.

As mentioned earlier, Jensen Huang has been actively lobbying the Trump administration over the past two years to ease restrictions on advanced chip exports to China.

He has indeed achieved considerable results, but has also offended a group of congressmen who have long advocated for strict technology restrictions on China.

For these individuals, Jensen Huang's greatest advantage was his ability to directly engage with Trump and persuade the White House to adjust policies through business interests.

This time, the intelligence controversy has struck at his Achilles' heel.

In the early stages, Congress wanted to oppose NVIDIA's sale of chips to China, which required debates with the White House surrounding technical performance, national security, and economic interests.

Now, they can directly question whether Jensen Huang himself poses a security risk, and even further inquire whether his past lobbying of the U.S. government was unduly influenced.

Therefore, once Jensen Huang's personal credibility is seriously questioned, even if he continues to lobby Trump in the future, he may face greater political resistance.

Moreover, this controversy has escalated after the U.S. midterm elections, where the Democratic Party won a majority in both the House and Senate, and Trump is about to face stronger congressional oversight.

However, the three committee chairs who first called for an investigation into Jensen Huang all come from the Republican Party.

This indicates that dissatisfaction with Jensen Huang has likely already transcended the partisan divides of the two major U.S. parties.

On the issue of advanced chip exports to China, there is already a similar stance between hardliners within the Republican Party and some Democratic lawmakers.

Thus, the related intelligence being concentrated and exposed at this time may be driven or amplified by certain political forces.

At least from the current developments, it is clear that the U.S. tech hardliners can leverage this controversy to gain more support for their long-held policy positions.

Trump's situation is equally awkward; he previously established a good relationship with Jensen Huang and genuinely hopes NVIDIA will continue to help the U.S. expand its AI industry advantage.

However, if subsequent investigations escalate, Trump’s continued support for Jensen Huang could be questioned by political opponents as excessive protection of tech giants, even neglecting national security risks.

In other words, this controversy is simultaneously increasing the political costs for both Jensen Huang and Trump; how far it will ultimately develop depends on how the U.S. Congress plans to utilize this matter next.

If the investigation remains focused on personal relationships and corporate security systems, the impact on NVIDIA may be relatively limited.

But if Congress uses this opportunity to re-examine NVIDIA's chip sales to China, Jensen Huang's previous lobbying activities, and the decision-making process behind the Trump administration's approval of related export licenses, the situation will become much more complicated.

Personally, I believe this latter possibility is more likely; for the political forces that have long opposed loosening restrictions on chip sales to China, rather than repeatedly debating with Jensen Huang about whether selling chips is beneficial, directly undermining his political influence in the White House may be more effective.

Jensen Huang's greatest past advantage was NVIDIA's unique position in the global AI industry and the relationships he built with the White House.

Now, both of these advantages may be subject to new political scrutiny due to a personal controversy.

And Jensen Huang's troubles may just be beginning.